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Twenty-two years after the decision of Smyth v. Ames' we find the
elusive principle of rate regulation written down in that celebrated
opinion, restated by the Supreme Court of Illinois in the following
language:
"The utility is entitled to ask a fair return upon the value' of that
which it employs for public convenience, but, on the other hand, the
public is entitled to demand that no more be exacted from it than the
services rendered are reasonably worth."
'2
In the case just quoted from, the Court made a valiant effort to follow
Smyth v. Ames, although it is evident that the insistence of able counsel
for the utility upon reproduction cost as the test of value and the
insistence of equally able counsel for the public upon original cost, or
let us say prudent investment, had demonstrated to the Court that
Smyth v. Ames is not a fixed star showing the way to a sound rate
basis but merely a will-o-the-wisp leading the explorer into a morass of
shifting, uncertain "valuations." The opinion in this Illinois case is
particularly worthy of consideration because of the perhaps uncon-
scious candor with which the court demonstrated the unsoundness of
the reasoning which it sought to uphold. Following the long line of
precedents of the breed of Smyth v. Ames, the Court attempted first
to set down the standards for ascertaining the value of a public utility
property with the avowed purpose of determining eventually that the
public should not pay more for services rendered than they were rea-
sonably worth. But the Court had been uncommonly well educated to
an understanding that "value" is a word difficult of definition and
that the ascertainment of "value" is a still more difficult matter. The
Court had arrived at an intelligence sadly lacking in many other
tribunals, and realized that the "value" sought as a rate base could not
be an "exchange value" and so the court held:
"Exchange values should not be considered by the Commission in
establishing the proper valuation as a basis for rate-making purposes.
The exchange value is, in the case of a property whose function is
simply to earn money, determined primarily by the earning power and
the more unjust and unreasonable the charge made by the utility, the
higher the exchange value. . . . Exchange value is therefore meas-
1 (1898) 169 U. S. 466, i8 Sup. Ct 418.
'State Utilities Coinmission v. Springfield Gas Company (1920) 291 Ill. 209,
217, 125 N. E. 89i, 895.
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ured by return. The Supreme Court of the United States said in the
Minnesota Rate Cases, 'the value of the utility as measured by return
cannot be made the criterion when the return itself is in question.' ,,
Yet, in rejecting exchange value the Illinois Court does not seem to
have realized that it has rejected the only pecuniary value which is
scientifically ascertainable. Even the Supreme Court of the United
States, before it led itself astray with the Smyth v. Ames doctrine,
recognized this fact:
"But the value of property results from the use to which it is put
and varies with the profitableness of that use, present and prospective,
actual and anticipated. There is no pecuniary value outside of that
which results from such use."'4
Prior to this opinion the Court had held upon similar reasoning that
"the value of property, generally speaking, is determined by its pro-
ductiveness-the profits which its use brings to the owner."5
If the Illinois Court had consulted the economists, it would have
found them in agreement with the Supreme Court of the United States
in limiting any intelligent use of the word "value" in terms of money
to: (i) value in exchange; (2) resulting from the profitableness of
the use; (3) where the profitableness is determined by competition.
Professor F. W. Taussig states the prevailing view of the economists
as follows :6
"The value of a commodity means in economics its power of com-
manding other commodities in exchange. It means the rate at which
the commodity exchanges for others. . . . The value of a com-
modity thus conceived is its value in exchange."
John Stuart Mill warned students of economics that values and prices
were determined by competition alone and stated a principle which the
courts can hardly dispute that "in so far only as they are thus deter-
mined can they be reduced to any assignable law."
In a recent article entitled, The "Physical Value" Fallacy in Rate
Cases,7 Mr. Robert L. Hale has so ably demonstrated that "value" must
depend upon earnings and therefore cannot be made the basis for
determining the earnings, that any further presentation of this branch
of the subject in the present article would be supererogative. The
cases which crowd the public utility reports amply prove the accuracy
'State Utilities Com. v. Springfield Gas Co., supra, at p. 227, 125 N. E. at p. 899.
" C. C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Backus (1894) 154 U. S..439, 445, 14 Sup. Ct. 1122,
1124.
'Monongahela Nay. Co. v. United States (1893) 148 U. S. 312, 328, 13 Sup. Ct.
622, 627.
i Principles of Economics (2d ed. 1915) 115.
t (1921) 30 YALE LAW jOURNAL, 710.
PERMANENT BASIS FOR RATE REGULATION 265
of Mr. Hale's statement that "this sanctity and certainty of the physi-
cal value theory of rates, it is submitted, is the result of loose reasoning
and serves merely to divert the time, attention and funds of regulating
bodies out of their proper channels into one of the most unreal fields of
speculation in which the minds of metaphysicians have disported them-
selves since the days of the medieval schoolmen." Yet even now, as
the courts and commissions show some signs of emerging from the
dark ages, there are, as Mr. Hale points out, "authorities who admit that
the value depends upon the earnings, but insist that the vicious circle
involved (in basing earnings on the value) can be escaped merely by
the simple expedient of measuring the value by replacement cost or
some other 'evidence.'"
It might have been apparent to the Illinois Court in the light of the
considerations above suggested that there could be no pecuniary value
fixed for a public utility property (nor for any other property) except
on the basis of the profitableness of the use of the property; and that,
therefore, no pecuniary value could be fixed until after rates had been
fixed; and that then the pecuniary value so fixed would be an exchange
value directly reflected in the market price of the stocks and bonds of
the utility. The court might have realized that, prior to the determina-
tion of the rate, the search for any "value" of the property would be
futile and absurd.
It seems clear from other portions of the Illinois opinion that the
Court, or certainly the learned Justice who wrote the opinion, under-
stood that the only measurable value of a public utility property is a
resultant of the rate, which cannot be ascertained in advance of the rate.
One might even suggest that this Court would have stated flatly that a
fair rate must be ascertained before the value of the property can be
determined had it not been for the brain-paralyzing effect of the state-
ment in Smyth v. Ames that "the basis of all calculations as to the rea-
sonableness of rates. . . .must be the fair value of the property."
Even the Supreme Court of the United States has discovered that it
can lay down no reliable standards for ascertaining this "value," and
has arrived finally at the delphic pronouncements in the Minnesota Rate
Cases that "the ascertainment of that value is not controlled by arti-
ficial rules. It is not a matter of formulas but there must be a rea-
sonable judgment having its basis in a proper consideration of all
relevant facts."'
Public utility commissions, being required to value utility properties
upon some basis other than their own unguided opinions, being forced
to act usually under pressure from the opposing elements of the public
and the public utility operators and then to subject their opinions to
judicial review, and, therefore, being desirous of justifying their
(1913) 230 U. S. 352, 434, 33 Sup. Ct. 729, 754.
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actions by some fixed rules, have found the "reasonable judgment"
approved by the Supreme Court quite useless as a standard for deter-
mining a rate base. The result of this condition was well stated in an
editorial note in the Michigan Law Review9 concluding with the
statement:
"The conclusion of this review of recent cases is that the Commissions
working at first hand with the practical problems of valuation generally
lean more and more decidedly toward fixing value-so-called-of pub-
lic utilities on prudent investment largely, and in not a few cases,
wholly. The courts on the other hand still wallow in the uncertainties
of the rule, which is scarcely a rule at all, of Smyth v. Ames, making
value a question of judgment. In the cases judgments continue to
vary as widely as ever."
The opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court in the Springfield Gas
Case is particularly interesting as an example of a valiant but vain
effort of a court to struggle out of the mire of Smyth v. Ames.
Curiously enough this Court set forth a definite, logical, and permanent
basis for rate regulation in a few sentences quite at variance with the
ultimate efforts of the Court to align its opinion with Smyth v. Ames.
These sentences excised from the opinion and placed in logical succes-
sion provide a valuable formula for rate regulation.
i. "Fixing rates by public authority may secure to each individual
the advantage of collective bargaining by all in behalf of the whole
body of consumers and result in such a rate as might properly be sup-
posed to result from free competition, if free competition were possi-
ble." (page 218)
2. "Ordinarily that is a reasonable charge or system of charges
which yields a fair return upon the investment." (page 217)
3. "The real test of the justice and reasonableness of any rate
seems to be that it should be as low as possible and yet sufficient to
induce the investment of capital in the business and its continuance
therein." (page 219)
4. "In rate cases the question in determining the value is not how
much has been or can be got out of the property, but how much has been
put into it, in order that from that fact may be determined how much
may be reasonably taken out of it in the way of net income." (page
227)
5. "We consider any value a fair value which fair and reasonable
men would say ought to be attached to the property, under all the
circumstances of the particular case, for the purpose of measuring a
return which the public should pay to the owner." (page 222)
If the above quotations are considered from the standpoint of ascer-
taining a fair rate (for which definite rules can be laid down) instead
of from the standpoint of ascertaining a fair value (for which no
(1921) i9 MIcH. L. REv. 849, 852.
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definite rule can be laid down) it will be found that the Court has shown
a method of determining what public utility services are reasonably
worth without the necessity of first putting an arbitrary and unscientific
"value" upon the property.
It is the proposition of the present article that, if the courts and com-
missions will devote their attention primarily to what public utility ser-
vices are reasonably worth, they can avoid all the uncertainties and the
miseries which have resulted from the Smyth v. Ames doctrine. They
can put rate making on a reasonably scientific basis and stabilize public
utility securities, all of which will benefit both the consumers and the
investors. Let us for the remainder of this article forget Smyth v.
Ames and its horrible brood of supporting opinions and consider again
the simple fundamentals of public utility rate regulation, grouping our
considerations under the five propositions of the Illinois Supreme Court
heretofore set forth.
PROPOSITION NO. I
The purpose of fixing rates by public authority is to secure for the
consumers such a rate "as might properly be supposed to result from
free competition if free competition were possible." It seems probable
that neither the consumer, the public utility operator, the investor, nor
public officials will dispute this proposition. It is appropriate then to
consider next what sort of a rate or charge usually results from free
competition. Under ordinary competitive conditions the price of any
article constantly tends to equal the cost of its production. This cost
of production of course includes not merely the cost of materials and
labor but also the cost of management and the market cost of capital
subjected to similar risks.
"On account of this tendency of prices to equal the expenses of pro-
duction, the expense of producing a unit of a commodity is called its
normal value."'
There are those who have sought to assert that cost of reproduction,
rather than cost of production, is the basis for determining normal
value. This suggestion is, however, waved aside as insignificant by
Alfred Marshall, dean of the English economists, who writes:
"This discussion of the risks of trade has again brought before us
the fact that the value of a thing though it tends to equal its normal
(money) cost of production, does not coincide with it at any particular
time, save by accident. Carey observing this, suggested that we should
speak of value in relation to (money) cost of reproduction instead of
in relation to cost of production.
"The suggestion has, however, no significance So far as normal
values are concerned. For normal cost of production and normal cost
"Ely, Economics (1909) bk. 2, part 4, ch. 12, p. 172.
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of reproduction are convertible terms and no real change is made by
saying that the normal value of a thing tends to equal its normal
(money) cost of reproduction instead of its normal (money) cost of
production. The former phrase is less simple than the latter but means
the same thing.
"And no valid argument for the change can be founded on the fact,
which may be readily admitted, that there are some few cases in which
the market value of a thing is nearer its cost of reproduction than the
cost that was actually incurred in producing that particular thing....
Cost of reproduction exerts little direct influence on value, save
when purchasers can conveniently wait for the production of new
supplies."'
Without indulging in an elaborate consideration of this question of
economics we may safely assert as a sound, reliable doctrine, which
courts and commissions could follow, that the surest method for deter-
mining the price of a commodity which would prevail in a condition of
free competition is to ascertain what has been and is the cost of pro-
dfucing that commodity. On this basis we may now pass to the second
proposition.
PROPOSITION NO. 2
In the cost of producing a commodity there are to be considered two
divisions of expense-the operating cost and the capital cost. If a
charge covers all operating costs (including labor, materials, manage-
ment, maintenance, and all other outgoes necessary td the continuous
operation of the business), there is left for consideration only the item
of a return upon the money invested. It is obvious that as long as a
business produces a fair return on investment and gives reasonable
security to investment, money will be available for that business, so
that there is no necessity for allowing anything more than a fair return
upon investment in order to assure investment. This brings us to the
third proposition.
PROPOSITION NO. 3
What is a fair return upon an investment may be measured by the
standard set by the Illinois Court that such a return should be "as low
as possible and yet sufficient to induce the investment of capital in the
business and its continuance therein." It is obvious that the greater
the security of capital, the lower will be the interest rate which will
induce the investment of capital. A speculative investment requires a
higher interest rate, not because the investor expects to earn more, but
because he fears he may earn less than through a safer investment.
If public utility rates are to be based on fluctuating "valuations" of
the property, the investor will demand a higher rate of return than
that which would satisfy him from a more stable investment.
i Marshall, Prnchiples of Economics (5th ed. i9o7) bk. 5, ch. 7, sec. 5, 6.
PERMANENT BASIS FOR RATE REGULATION 269
Of course rising and falling costs of operation, efficiency and ineffi-
ciency of management, and the amount of demand for the service are all
factors affecting the security of a public utility investment, but it will
hardly be denied that a majgr factor of uncertainty in investments in
regulated public utilities, where accounts are open to the public, where
security issues are supervised and the management is exposed to
authoritative criticism, is the "valuation" which may be placed on the
properties of the utility and thereby determine the earning power of the
capital invested.
In the development of the public utilities of the country speculative
inducements may have been necessary. In the development of new
utilities or utilities in new communities such inducements may still be
necessary and a much higher rate of return permitted-with possibly
a chance for speculative profit-in order to interest capital. But the
principal problems of public utility regulation today involve the regula-
tion of established utilities serving communities assuring a demand for
service which can be reasonably estimated.: It is submitted that in
dealing with this problem a fixed return on investment, subject to no
fluctuations on account of revaluations of property, will induce the
investment of capital most effectively-particularly because the factors
permitting of political attack will be largely eliminated. It is difficult
for any politician to combat the request of a public utility for a rate
sufficient to pay operating expenses and the prevailing rate of interest
on securities representing investment. But where the so-called "value"
of the property upon which a return is to be earned in the rates is
ioo% greater when that value is estimated by the engineers for the
utility than when that value is estimated by engineers representing the
public, a fruitful and continuing basis for political controversy is
obvious.
An example may be taken from the recent conference report sub-
mitted by engineers representing the Company, the City, and the Com-
mission in the appraisal of the properties of The Peoples Gas Light &
Coke Company of Chicago.1 2 The engineers representing these three
parties found the historical reproduction cost new of the physical prop-
erty (without adding overheads, or deducting depreciation, or including
working capital, or any going value) to be $51,307,116; the reproduc-
tion cost using prices as of a ten-year average (19o6-i915) $54,951,
7o9; the reproduction cost using prices as of July 1, 1920, $122,504,470.
Subsequent attempts to state the value of the property,, including all
factors and based principally on the foregoing figures of structural cost,
ranged from the City's low figure of historical cost, including over-
heads and deducting the accrued depreciation, $43,401,177, to the Com-
pany's top figure of reproduction cost, $156,752,681.
"2See Order of Public Utilities Commission of Illinois in Proceeding No. 7689,
entered December 21, I920.
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It must be plain that there is no scientific basis for finding a "value"
in figures showing such a tremendous variance. It may be mentioned
in passing that the Commission fixed the "fair value" at $85,000,000,
this figure being the result of adding together findings of $72,ooo,oo0
for "present value" of the property, plus $7,000,000 for "going
value," plus $6,ooo,ooo for working capital. It should be noted again
that the figures showing the original cost of the property and reproduc-
tion cost on various pricing bases were agreed to by engineers repre-
senting the Company, the Commission, and the City, in a conference
inaugurated at the suggestion of the writer, who represented the City
of Chicago. Therefore in seeking a scientific basis for rate regula-
tion the Commission was not required to reconcile conflicts of testimony
between engineers. But the Commission was faced with the impossi-
ble task of making a scientific application of the differing cost figures in
order to determine that utterly unscientific and indeterminate thing
called "the present fair value of the property."
In this case the Commission allowed a rate of 7Y2 % as a fair return
upon the "value" of the Company's property. Yet the "values"
which the Commission might have found on the testimony presented
to it might have varied over $50,000,000. Such a variance would have
made a difference of $3,750,000 a year in gas bills or a difference of
more than 12 cents per M. Cu. Ft. in the rate. The Company has
appealed from the decision of the Commission.
Gas rates have been a fruitful source of litigation in Chicago for the
past fifty years and the main controversy has concerned the "value" of
the gas company's property. It must be obvious that by the time the
present litigation is settled its determination of the "value" of the
Company's property will be practically worthless, if the theory of valu-
ation (to find a rate base) continues effective in the courts. We shall
be in a few years in a new era of prices and any conclusions based even
in part on present prices must be subject to future revision. In this
connection let us note that the stock of this Gas Company, which sold
as high as 130 in the year 1913, sold as low as 28 in the year 1919, and
that its principal bond issue which sold consistently over par up to 1913
sold as low as 57 in 1919.
It should be painfully obvious from a consideration of the experience
of this utility that if rates are to be based on fluctuating valuations they
will not be "as low as possible" and at the same time "sufficient to
induce the investment of capital in the business and its continuance
therein." But if rates are not to be based upon valuations what should
they be based upon? This brings us to the next proposition of the
Illinois Supreme Court.
PERMANENT BASIS FOR RATE REGULATION 271
PROPOSITION NO. 4
After the above exposition of the difficulties to be encountered in
establishing the "value" of a public utility property upon the basis of
engineers' estimates of the cost of producing or reproducing the prop-
erty, it is natural to subscribe enthusiastically to the statement of the
United States Supreme Court that "never was it held that the cost of a
thing is the test of its value."'13 Nor is it difficult to approve of the
statement of the Illinois Supreme Court in the Springfield Gas Case to
the effect that the value of public utility property is not that value
sought in consideration of private industrial property and determined
by the amount which "can be got out of the property," but is in fact
(although the court does not say this) not a "value" at all, but merely
a figure which it is reasonable and just to use as a rate base. This
must be what the court means when it makes the following pro-
nouncement:
"In rate cases the question in determining the value is not how much
has been or can be got out of the property, but how much has been put
into it, in order that from that fact may be determined how much may
be reasonably taken out of it in the way of net income."'
14
In this statement the court takes a position, rare among judicial
tribunals reviewing rate regulations, in that it plants its feet firmly
upon solid ground and states a scientific basis upon which a rate can be
determined. The court sets up the standard that a fair return should
be based, not upon the theoretical earning capacity of the property, but
upon a consideration of what the property represents as investors'
sacrifice from which the investor is entitled to a reasonable income.
Would that it were possible to hope that the Supreme Court of the
United States may yet emerge from the swamp of Smyth v. Ames and
get its feet upon equally solid ground! It seems hopeless to expect that
such an emergence may come from any further arguments over how to
determine fair value. Twenty years of arguments over methods of
determining fair value have finally forced our highest court through
statements of rules and qualifications, and restatements and requalifica-
tions to the evasive position that ascertainment of value "is not a mat-
ter of formulas but there must be a reasonable judgment having its
basis in a proper consideration of all relevant facts," leaving what is
"reasonable" or "proper" or "relevant" to be determined by each
court that passes on the question in each separate case according to its
transient opinion.' 5
Ca,. C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Backas (1894) 154 U. S. 439, 446, 14 Sup. Ct 1122,
1124.
14 Utilities Com. v. Spritngfield Gas Co. (i92o) 291 Ill. 2o9, 227, 125 N. E. 891,
899.
II Minnesota Rate Cases, supra 8.
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The hope for the introduction of fixed standards for the solution of
this very important problem lies rather in presenting rate regulation to
the court from a new angle. The eyes of the court have been fixed
upon the property rights of the investor, yet the property rights of the
investor might be better secured if the court's attention could be drawn
to the other factor of equal importance in rate regulation-in fact
to the primary purpose of rate regulation-the determination of what
the service is reasonably worth.
HOW TO DETERMINE THE WORTHE OF THE SERVICE
It is entirely possible to determine what a public utility service is
reasonably worth without any effort whatsoever to ascertain the
so-called "value" of the public utility property used for furnishing the
service. Let us return for the moment to Proposition No. I and
endeavor to ascertain "such a rate as might properly be supposed to
result from free competition if free competition were possible." In
order to make this assumption it is not necessary to assume that there
never has been competition and to endeavor to determine the cost of
now establishing the competition. During the growth of New York
City, for example, there might have been a continual competition in
practically all public utility service. As a result, if free competition
were possible today, two competing gas plants might be located on real
estate which cost each of them $50,000. To establish competition today
another gas plant might be required to pay $500,000 for an equally
desirable tract of land. But since the public has always been entitled
to a reasonable rate based on the theory of continuing free competition,
there is no sound theoretical basis for the assumption of a non-
competitive period and the necessity of suddenly inaugurating competi-
tion at the present time in an established communit#. The ruling of the
United States Supreme Court in the Des Moines Gas Case6 in refusing
to add the cost of cutting through pavements to the reproduction cost
of gas mains is in line with this reasoning. There is no reason why the
community should pay a tax to public utilities on the wealth created by
the community.
From the beginning the privately owned public utility has been fur-
nishing a service which the community itself could have furnished.
A consideration of this potential competition shows a sound basis for
using the actual cost to the operators of furnishing service as the basis
for finding the worth of the service. If a municipality invested $i,ooo,
ooo in the real estate necessary for a gas plant and then grew up around
the plant to such an extent that the market value of similar real estate
adjoining equalled $2,ooo,ooo, the city officials would never consider
1 Des Moines Gas Co. v. Des Moines (1915) 238 U. S. 153, 172, 35 Sup. Ct 811,
817 (commented on Hale, op. cit. 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 710, 729).
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demanding a return on $2,ooo,ooo in the gas rates. It is difficult to see
why the service should be reasonably worth any more to the consumer
merely because of private ownership of the land upon which the plant
is located. In cold fact, the service is not worth any more. Land only
increases in value because of its increased earning power, but if the
rates of a private gas company are tested from year to year by the
standard of assumed competition from a municipally owned plant, the
earning power of the gas company's land will not increase.
Applying the legal theory of assumed competition and the concomit-
ant economic theory that under free competition prices tend constantly
to equal the cost of service, we can determine the worth of the service
furnished by any utility on a mathematical basis by adding to the oper-
ating cost the current rate of interest on the capital which actually and
prudently has been put into, and remains in, the enterprise. If the books
of a utility are properly kept, those books will show the exact amount
of money which has been invested. If the books are not properly kept
competent engineers and accountants can determine with seasonable
accuracy the amount of prudent investment which must have been
made in the development of the properties, using the historical repro-
duction cost, not as the basis for determining any elusive "value" of
the property, but for the 'simple purpose of determining the capital cost
of the service.
The rate of return will vary from time to time as the. market rate
for money changes. Here again it should not be the theoretical cost
of theoretical capital but the actual cost of actual capital which should
be considered in the rate of return. If the company has a long term
issue of bonds bearing 5% interest, the company should be allowed the
cost actually incurred to obtain and use this capital. If the compatiy
has stock outstanding, the money represented by that stock should carry
the current rate of interest for securities of similar standing. This will
enable the company to issue at par further stock as funds are required
for extensions.
It may be objected to this theory of rate regulation that while it
could be applied fairly and scientifically to a newly organized utility,
nevertheless, where utilities have been developed through the unregu-
lated period, through the period when public utility development was a
speculative business and when large amounts of securities representing
no investment were issued in order to induce the investment of the
necessary amount of actual capital, this will be a policy destructive of
large present values in public utility securities, destructive of credit
necessary for the present efficient operation of such utilities, and a
cause of grave hardship to thousands of investors and of general injury
to public utility service.
It must be admitted that any policy of public utility regulation today
which lifts an unfair burden from many consumers will place that bur-
YALE LAW JOURNAL
den upon the investors. It is also often difficult to determine whether
the consuming public or the investing public should in all fairness carry
this burden. It is easy for a representative of the public to assert that
the investor, who has bought securities not representing actual capital
investment, should suffer the loss caused by his own bad judgment. It
is easy for an investor to assert that the public, which permitted and
even encouraged the exploitation of public service, should bear the bur-
den of that exploitation. It is often difficult to draw a legal line
sharply between what has been an honest speculation in public utilities
and a dishonest exploitation. But if each public utility is considered
separately it should be possible to draw an equitable line. It should be
possible to weigh the relative cost to the public of a period of disorgan-
ization of a public service through the requirement of a complete finan-
cial reorganization of a public service company and a continued
carrying of an excessive burden by the public in order to maintain the
continuity of efficient public service.
For example, a certain gas company has been required to amortize,
at the rate of $2oo,ooo a year, a payment of some $5,000,000 repre-
senting no addition to its property. This means an addition to the gas
rate of about two-thirds of a cent per M. Cu. Ft. if this amortization
charge is added to operating expenses, or the sacrifice of about Y2o in
dividends if it is taken out of the stockholders. But if this $5,000,000
were made the basis for an addition to capital, upon which a rate of
return of 72 0 were allowed, this would mean a continuing charge of
$375,ooo a year or about .oiY4 per M. Cu. Ft. of gas. Certainly it is
better to begin a new policy, whether the burden of it shall be imposed
upon the consumer or the investor or divided between them. In a few
years both the consumer and the investor will begin to profit by the
establishment of any sound and permanent basis for rate regulation.
PROPOSITION NO. 5
There are considerations such as those last referred to, which should
be taken into account by commissions and courts in fixing the rate basis
as the amount "which fair and reasonable men would say ought to be
attached to the property under all the circumstances of the particular
case for the purpose of measuring a return which the public should pay
to the owner." In dealing with the difficulties which have arisen out
of the development of public utilities through a long unregulated period
we enter upon a field for the application of equitable principles. In
this field there is a splendid opportunity for intelligent and courageous
negotiation between representatives of the public and representatives
of the utilities to establish a permanent rate base to represent what may
be called the investment in each public utility at the time of the estab-
lishment of the permanent base. All future additions to such a rate
base should represent actual additions to the capital investment.
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The factors to be considered in such negotiations are well described
in an article by Mr. Gerard C. Henderson, entitled, Railway Valuation
and the Courts.17 But if out of such negotiations could come an end
to political controversies over utility 'rates, an end to wide fluctuations
in market values of public utility securities, an end to exorbitant interest
rates for financing necessary developments of public service, even the
cost of several million dollars of unjust charges for capital, imposed
upon the public, would be reimbursed in the next generation many times
over through the improvement of the public service and the resulting
improved prosperity of the country.
There might be a distinction made, in endeavoring to ascertain that
amount which fair and reasonable men would say sho*uld be used "for
the purpose of measuring a return which the public should pay,"
between the validation of securities representing no money investment
which were issued as a part of the original construction of the
utility, and those which may haie been issued in some later financial
exploitation.
For example, in constructing a line of elevated railroad in the City
of Chicago at an actual cost of about $2,500,000, five million dollars of
bonds and five million dollars of stock were issued. The construction
company which took $5,000,000 of bonds in a speculative enterprise in
payment for its actual cash outlays accepted a certain risk, and to vali-
date the excess $2,500,000 of bonds means principally that the public
pays io% interest for a public utility service because capital could not
be induced to supply the service at a lower rate. It might be argued
that even the promoters who took the $5,oo,0oo of stock were entitled
to levy a considerable tax upon the public service because of the risks
they took and the energy and foresight which they exercised in pro-
viding that service.
As another type of exploitation may be cited the financial reorgan-
ization of the Chicago & Alton under the late E. H. Harriman whereby,
according to the report of the Interstate Commerce Commission, some
$6o,ooo,ooo of securities were imposed as a burden on public service
without the additiorf of a dollar of actual capital. Representatives of
the public might well hesitate to write this $6o,ooo,ooo into a permanent
rate base.
As indicated by the foregoing examples there are two separate lines
of policy which must be utilized by representatives of the public and
by public utility operators in endeavoring to work out a permanent
solution for the problem of the regulation of public utilities. This gen-
eration inherits a mass of difficult questions which must be solved
individually for each utility in the endeavor to do justice to consumer
and investor, and in the solution of these questions there is room for
17 (192o) 33 HAiv. L. REv. 9o2.
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and neccesity for a "reasonable judgment," a weighing of equitable
considerations, a striking of a balance between expediencies.
This generation also faces the necessity of establishing a line of
future policy whereby the basis of future regulation of public util-
ities can be made certain and permanent. It is hopeless to seek
for a future policy to prevail under public regulation which can be
applied absolutely to the solving of utility problems which have
arisen during the unregulated period. Each problem arising out
of a period of non-regulation must be treated separately. But the
problems of the future, if they are to be handled intelligently,
should find their solution in the establishment of a. definite scientific
method for determining a rate base. There is nothing definite or
scientific in a shifting rate base determined by the revaluation of public
utility properties every few years as price levels shift or as general
community values rise and decline.
Since this article has been written largely from the standpoint of the
consumer, let us consider for a moment the standpoint of the investor.
There is a great need today for stocks and bonds of assured earning
power offering an exceptionally sound security, for the investment of
trust funds or for provision by people of small means against accident,
disability, and old age. There is a great demand foik such securities
for the investment of funds of banks and insurance companies and for
the surpluses of large corporations. Public utility securities should
offer an ideal investment for such funds and public utility securities
should always command the necessary capital for the extension and
improvement of public utility service, upon which the prosperity of the
commercial life and the comfort of the social life of every community
in a large part depends.
Through a long era of rapid commercial growth under a philosophy
of rampant individualism and unrestricted freedom of private enter-
prise, the public utilities of the country have been developed as private
speculations. We have now come to realize the menace to the national
welfare of unregulated private control of necessities. We have been
experimenting for about fifty years with public regulation. If public
regulation fails we shall undoubtedly embark on extensive experiments
in public ownership. Those who believe most sincerely in private
ownership should lend their best efforts to insure the success of public
regulation. But if public regulation is to succeed, it must be based
upon fixed standards and principles so that our regulatory bodies may
function as exponents of a "government of laws, not of men."
Professor F. W. Taussig has well written:
"It is not too much to say that the future of democracy will depend
on its success in dealing with the problems of public ownership and
regulation."1 8
i2 Principles of Economics (19H) 411.
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In dealing with the problem of rate regulation it has become quite
clear that to state that "rates should be based upon the fair value of
the property utilized in public service" is not to state a principle but
merely to evade such a statement. When the earning power of a
property is the very question at issue and when any ascertainable
"value" is the result and not the cause of the earning power, it is a
scientific impossibility to find the value of a property before deter-
mining its earning power.
If, however, the principle is established that the earning power of a
public utility property should be allowed to equal, but not to exceed,
the cost of the service, then a rate may be determined by the mathe-
matical calculation of that rate which will return to the operators the
cost of operation and the cost to the operators of the capital which
they have actually and necessarily employed in the enterprise. If part
of that capital has been contributed by the public, there will remain the
question as to whether the public contributed the capital to the private
owners to induce them to establish the enterprise (as in the case of
land donations) or as to whether the public has merely contributed the
use of the capital, in which latter case the private owners of the remain-
der of the property have no basis for charging the public for the use
which they obtain without cost.
The main necessity for clear thinking in the field of public utility
regulation seems to the present writer to be to substitute the use of the
understandable word "cost" for the use of the unintelligible word
"value."
To those opportunists who will seize immediatelr upon the word
"cost" and demand that cost to reproduce should be made the standard,
two answers may be suggested.
First, the only possible argument in favor of cost of reproduction
springs from the analogous use of cost of reproduction in private com-
petitive business. That is, it is fallaciously claimed that since cost of
reproduction may determine the competitive cost in private business,
therefore it should determine the potential competitive cost in public
utility service. But the cost .of reproduction so far as utilized in
establishing prices in private business is not the cost of reproducing
the identical property but the cost of reproducing an equally serviceable
property. Or, let us say, it is the cost of reproducing the article or ser-
vice, or an equally useful article or service, and never the cost of repro-
ducing a particular plant. In truth, invention and improvement work
changes in all industrial operations so rapidly that it is difficult to find
any plant a few years old which would be reproduced by competent
engineers in the same form today. Therefore, to utilize the idea of
cost of reproduction intelligently is not to utilize the cost of reproduc-
tion of any particular property but of a service or of an equally useful
service. It must be apparent that such a basis for rate. making would
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open up a new field for speculative estimating, to the increased profit
of engineers and lawyers and to the increased confusion of the courts
and commissions and would bring increasing instability to all public
utility operations.
Second, it should be pointed out that we are at present quite
obviously entering upon a period of declining prices and that in deter-
mining a rate base any use of figures representing the cost to repro-
duce the identical property will deprive public utilities in the near
future of any return upon millions of dollars of actual investments
which have been made in the last few years in properties which may be
reproduced in the years soon to come for less than the amount of the
investments which they represent. In such a time it will seem as
unfair to the investor that his investment should be scaled down and
that the return on his capital should be diminished because of declining
price levels as it has seemed unfair to the consumer that the investor's
capital should be inflated and his return increased because of rising
price levels.
The essential theory which seems more just is that investment in
public utility securities, whether denominated as stock or bonds, should
be regarded practically as an investment in bonds bearing a fixed return
with the principal protected against impairment through appropriate
depreciation and maintenance charges. It would seem a sound princi-
ple to regard the operators of public utilities as trustees of the service
for the public and of the capital invested for the security holders. It
should be their obligation to keep costs as low as consistent with
efficient service and to do all in their power to insure investors of capi-
tal a safe non-speculative rate of return. Public utility operators who
recognize these obligations cannot support theories of public utility
regulation which make public utility securities a speculative invest-
ment and subject public utility service to the hazards of speculative
enterprise.
Public utility operators and public officials alike, who are not finan-
cial or political demagogues, should join in a demand for the establish-
ment in the courts and commissions of the doctrine that a reasonable
rate for public utility service should be fixed on the basis of the reason-
able cost of the service and that the reasonable cost of the service
should be ascertained by the addition to current operating expenses of
the amount of interest required to recompense at market rates the
capital actually and prudently employed in producing the service and
to induce the further investment of capital needed for desirable
extensions and improvements.
A CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION
Before closing this article perhaps brief consideration should be
given to the question inevitably presented to a proponent of the theory
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of prudent investment. Would a rate basis so established, either by
commissions or by act of the legislature, be held constitutional in the
cotirts of last resort? It is common to approach this question from the
a priori assumption that we are endeavoring to find the value of the
public utility property. On this assumption the courts have reasoned
that the value of the property is not determined by original cost figures
or by investment figures but is something changing from day to day
according to surrounding conditions and that, at any particular time,
unless the owners of public utility property are permitted to earn a fair
return upon the "present value" of .the property, they will be deprived
of a part of the value of their property, and thereby deprived of
property.'9
The reasoning that follows on this assumption loses its force if the
fact is accepted that not only is it unnecessary to determine the value
of the property prior to fixing the rates but that as a matter of fact no
value for the property can be determined prior to fixing the rates
except that value which the property has by virtue of its existing
earning power. Of course it is obvious that the existing actual
value is not to be protected by the courts because on such a theory
rates would have to be maintained always on the basis necessary
to maintain the earning power of the property exactly as when
regulation of the utility first began. If the courts can be brought
to realize that the word "value" means nothing except a resultant of
earning power and that the value of a property cannot be ascertained
until after its earning power is fixed, then figures showing the prudent
investment in a property can be presented, not as evidence of the value
of the property, but as evidence of the cost to the owners of the prop-
erty of providing public service. The courts viewing the operators of
the property as trustees who must obtain from the public reimburse-
ment for outgoes, will find the evidence of the prudent investment in
the property relevant and essential to determine the amount of capital
upon which the operators must pay the market rate in order to continue
to furnish service. In this investigation there is no inquiry whatsoever
as to the value of the property. In fact, the question of the value of
the property is entirely irrelevant.
For example, a public utility plant is located on real estate which cost
$ioo,ooo twenty years ago. Adjoining real estate of equal size now is
worth $500,000. Of course if the rates are to be based on the "value"
of the company's property then each particular piece of property must
be given a "value." As evidence of this value the court may receive
testimony concerning the amount actually paid for the property and
estimates of experts as to what the property could be sold for today
" There is an admirable discussion of this judicial theory in Mr. Hale's article
from which quotation has been made heretofore. See Hale, op. cit. 3o YAL. LAW
JouRNIA, 710.
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and other evidence customarily utilized in valuing property held in
private ownership. But if the court is endeavoring to find out the cost
of public utility service so that the operators, who are quasi-public ser-
vants, may be reimbursed in the rates for the cost of furnishing the
service, the court will not be interested in seeking to find the value of
any specific items of the company's property. The court will find it
necessary only to ascertain, in. the language of the Supreme Court of
Illinois,2 0 "how much has been put into it (the property) in order that
from that fact may be determined how much may be reasonably taken
out of it in the way of net income."
It will be observed, therefore, that in fixing rates on the basis of cost
of service, all constitutional questions as to depriving an owner of his
property, or of a part of the so-called value of his property, are avoided
because the court does not make any effort to ascertain the value of the
property and the court by its ruling does not take from the owner any
value which may be claimed on any theory. The court merely applies
to the facts presented the legal principle that the consumer is entitled to
obtain public utility service for what it is reasonably worth; that it is
reasonably worth what it would cost under conditions of free competi-
tion; that under the conditions of free competition the cost of the ser-
vice to the consumer constantly approaches the cost of producing the
service; and that, therefore, when the actual cost of producing the
service is ascertained, the worth of the service to the consumer, that is,
a just and reasonable rate, is ascertained; and at no stage in this
process has the court concerned itself with any hypothetical "value" of
the property of the. owners of the utility or in fact found it necessary
to consider in any way rights of property of public utility owners.
It is apparent that such a method of rate regulation may deprive
owners of utilities of profit which they might make under a different
system of regulation, but that consideration is quite irrelevant. Exer-
cises of legislative power, particularly in the domain of the police
power, constantly and almost invariably operate to deprive individuals
of profits which they might earn in the absence of such exercise of
power. But if the authority of the State to enforce a regulatory princi-
ple is once admitted, the incidental effect of such enforcement upon
the profitableness of business operations (and if you please, on the
resultant "values" of properties utilized in business) is immaterial and
irrelevant. If, therefore, the State has authority to require that public
service be rendered to the consumer at its reasonable worth and the
corollary to that principle is established that reasonable worth is ascer-
tained by assuming a condition of free competition, then the question
of the effect on private profits of the imposition of that requirement
upon public utilities becomes wholly irrelevant.
"Utilities Comnzission v. Springfield Gas Company (1920) 291 II. 209, 227,
125 N. E. 891, 899.
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There is one further suggestion which may make clear why there is
no necessity for meeting the question of unconstitutional deprivation of
property in the case of rate regulation. The word "property" is as
commonly misused as the word "value." "Property" in its exact
sense means the rights of the owner in the thing possessed. It means
the domain which the owner is permitted by law to exercise over the
thing possessed.
"In its proper use the term 'property' applies only to the rights of
the owner in the thing possessed."
'2
'
"Property, in its broader sense, is not the physical thing which may
be the subject of ownership, but is the right of dominion, possession
and power of disposition which may be acquired over it; and the right
of property, preserved by the constitution, is the right not only to pos-
sess and enjoy it, but also to acquire it in any lawful mode, or by any
lawful industrial pursuit which the citizen, in the exercise of the liberty
guaranteed, may choose to adopt."
22
In a recent case in the United States Supreme Court the true defini-
tion of property was utilized. Mr. Justice Holmes wrote :23
"Property, a creation of the law, does not arise from value, although
exchangeable as a matter of law. Many exchangeable values may be
destroyed intentionally without compensation. Property depends upon
exclusion by law from interference . ...
Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting, wrote :24
"The essential element of individual property is the legal right to
exclude others from enjoying it. If the property is private, the right
of exclusion may be absolute. If the property is affected with the pub-
lic interest, the right of exclusion is qualified."
It is axiomatic that owners of land or other physical things, devoting
such things to public service by that very act limit their property inter-
ests. If the profitableness of the use of investment in public utility
service is diminished by state enforcement of principles which are
accepted as a limitation on private operation of public utilities, the prop-
erty owner cannot possibly complain that he is deprived of property by
action of the state, because he himself by devoting his money or some
other valuable thing to public utility service has accepted a limitation
upon his dominion in the things he possesses, so that he' has no prop-
erty rights which are taken away by enforcement of the accepted princi-
ples of public utility operation. Even Mr. Justice Brewer pointed this
out, although in dictum:
" 23 A. & E. Enc. Law, 261.
' Braceville Coal Co. v. People (1893) 147 Ill. 66, 71, 35 N. E. 62, 63.
'International News Service v. Associated Press (i918) 248 U. S. 215, 246, 39
Sup. Ct. 68, 75.
1 Ibid. at p. 250, 39 Sup. Ct. at p. 76.
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"If in such case in individual is willing to undertake the work of the
State, may it not be urged that he in a measure subjects himself to the
same rules of action, and that if the body which expresses the judgment
of the State believes that the particular service should be rendered with-
out profit he is not at liberty to complain? .... .Is there not force in
the suggestion that as the State may do the work without a profit, if he
voluntarily undertakes to act for the State he must submit to a like
determination as to the paramount interests of the public ? ' 25
The Supreme Court of Illinois in a case affirmed by the Supreme
Court of the United States said:
"Where lands are restricted, by law or by the terms of a grant, to a
particular use, the measure of compensation, in a condemnation pro-
ceeding, to the owner for the lands taken will be their value to him for
the special use to which they are restricted. . . . Hence, we think
that there was no error in excluding testimony offered for the purpose
of showing the general salable value of the right of way included in
the crossing, or its general value for other uses than that to which it
was applied."26
It is submitted that public utility rates should be fixed upon standards
which would eliminate automatically from the cases any constitu-
tional question as to deprivation of property. The property of the
owners of public utilities is the dominion which under the law they are
permitted to exercise over the things possessed. That dominion is
subject to a paramount obligation to furnish service to the public at
what the service is reasonably worth. The service is reasonably worth
to the public what it costs to produce it. The cost of production is the
cost of operation and the cost of obtaining and retaining the necessary
capital to establish and operate the machinery that furnishes public
service. The only ascertainable value of a public utility property is
the capitalization of the earning power of that property, under rates
determined on the basis of finding what amount is necessary to
reimburse the company for the cost of furnishing the maximum
amount of service which the community will absorb. If rates for a
utility are once fixed upon this basis, it will be found that a permanent
rate base has been determined and that the increase or decrease of the
amount of that rate base in the future will be principally a process of
mathematical computation, forming no proper basis either for political
controversy or for the expensive and wasteful proceedings known as
valuation hearings. The establishment of such a permanent basis for
rate regulation will go far toward bringing about a new stability in
public utility securities, and a greatly increased and healthy prosperity
for the utilities and for the communities, whose business growth and
social comfort depend so largely upon public utility service.
' Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co. (19Ol) 183 U. S. 79, 93, 22 Sup. Ct.
30, 36.
'C. B. & Q. Ry. v. City of Chicago (1894) 149 Ill. 457, 461, 37 N. E. 78, 79;
see also Chicago, etc. Ry. v. Catholic Bishop (1887) 119 Ill. 525, 1o N. E. 372.
